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ABSTRACT
Previous research on the effects of sanction threat 
suggests that perceptions of sanctions as consequential may be 
negatively related to norm and rule violations. In addition, 
one recent model examines the relationship between social 
control and integration. This study presents a general model 
of the relationship between commitment, as an indication of 
integration, perceptions of sanction threats, rule violations, 
and social control. The data suggest that the relationship 
between commitment, social control and violation may be more 
complicated than is commonly assumed. Data from the National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth is used to partially test the 
model as it applies to school related rule violations. The 
results of the study suggest that weakly committed individuals 
may perceive sanction threat to be greater than do strongly 
committed individuals. The weakly committed also may be more 
deterred by perceived sanction threat than are the highly 
committed. It is suggested that the imposition of social 
control may act to reduce the level of commitment for the 
respondents in this study, though there are measurement and 
data problems that temper such an interpretation.
v
TOWARD A GENERAL MODEL OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
AND SCHOOL RELATED VIOLATIONS
2INTRODUCTION
The utilitarian model of behavior suggests that individuals 
act based on estimates of costs and benefits. The deterrence 
doctrine applies this conception to the question of deviance. 
The deterrence doctrine holds that penalties for deviant 
behaviors will deter people from committing such behaviors. 
Some have suggested that it is perceptions of sanctions as 
consequential that deter (Tittle, 1980). One factor that may 
mediate the effects of sanctions is commitment to a specific 
rule or law, or to the conventional order in general. Those 
who perceive law as moral and legitimate may react differently 
than those who do not to threatened sanctions. Some research 
suggests sanction threat is more likely to affect those who 
have a weak moral commitment to obeying the rules (cf. Tittle, 
1980).
Commitment to the normative order may vary over time. 
Moreover, some research and theories suggest that the 
application of social control affects individual commitment 
and societal integration (cf. Durkheim,1964) . Social control 
may increase integration by legitimating conventional behavior 
and by censuring behaviors outside of the norm. On the other 
hand, social control also may reduce commitment and social
3integration (cf. Aday, 1990, Aday and Anderson, 1991). Either 
or both of these may occur, and the relationship between 
commitment and social control would vary accordingly.
This study examines the interaction between commitment, 
sanction threat, rule violations, and social control using 
data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth. I will 
examine the relationship between sanction threat and school 
related rule violations, specifically skipping school and 
fighting in school. Stinchcombe (1964, 1-2,7) notes that rule 
violations in primary and secondary schools occur in a 
specific structural setting in which the sources of authority 
are immediately present. He considers such deviance to be a 
flouting of rules and regulations more than an avoidance of 
the rules. He characterizes these violations as rebellion 
against the conventional role of youth in our society.
In this study I examine the relationship between 
perceptions of sanctions and rule violations taking into 
account commitment to the conventional order. More 
specifically, commitment is measured in terms of academic 
plans. I expect that those who are more committed will 
perceive sanctions as more important and constraining. This 
perception of sanctions as consequential should be related 
negatively to rates of violation. Perceptions of sanction 
threats as inconsequential should be related to higher levels 
of violation.
The research also examines the relationship between
4social control and commitment. Social control and commitment 
should be positively related for those who are highly 
committed to the conventional order. Social control and 
commitment should be negatively related for those who are 
weakly committed to the conventional order. Some theory 
(Durkheim,1964) and common sense suggest that the two are 
related in a simple and inverse fashion: those who are
committed do not violate norms and laws and, thus, commitment 
and social control are negatively related. The concern in 
this thesis is that social control may reduce commitment for 
those who are weakly committed. I examine this relationship 
by comparing commitment measured at time one with commitment 
measured at a later time and following the imposition of 
social control.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Deterrence, Sanctions, and Violations
The deterrence doctrine is rooted in philosophical 
utilitarianism, and offers a view of people as profit 
maximizers. That is, humans are seen as calculating profits 
from estimates of gains and costs as they consider a course of 
action (Geerken and Grove, 1975: 497). Though there has been 
much sociological research on deterrence since the late 
1960's, no accepted systematic theory has been produced. The 
concept itself is subject to different definitions, and varies
5according to the perspective of the researcher. For example, 
Gibbs (1975:2) defines it as the omission of an act in 
response to the perceived risk and fear of punishment for 
contrary behavior, with punishment conceptualized as "legal" 
in character. More recent definitions include extra-legal 
sanctions such as peer or parental reactions. The different 
conceptualizations of the variables involved in deterrence 
have produced conflicting results on the effectiveness of 
deterrence, and have resulted in opposing conclusions 
concerning the relationship between sanctions and violations.
The earliest sociological studies on the effects of 
sanctions in deterring crime focus on the statutory death 
penalty (Sellin, 1952; Schuessler, 1952; Savititz, 1958). 
Research on deterrence expanded to include the relationship 
between actual legal punishments, especially imprisonment, and 
aggregate rates of crime (Gibbs, 1968, Tittle, 1969). More 
recent studies using individual level self-report data examine 
the effects of extra-legal sanctions (Anderson, Chiricos, and 
Waldo, 1977; Tittle, 1980) and the interaction of deterrence 
variables with variables derived from other theoretical 
approaches to deviant behavior (Tittle and Rowe, 1974; 
Silberman, 1976; Tittle, 1980; Aday and Anderson, 1991).
Early Research at the Aggregate Level 
Early research focuses on the relationship between aggregate 
rates of crime and certainty and severity of sanctions. 
Research on the deterrent effect of statutory laws concerning
6capital punishment examine homicide rates in states with 
capital punishment and those without capital punishment (cf. 
Waldo and Chiricos, 1972, Schuessler, 1952). Few differences 
are found in these comparisons. The same is true when rates 
are compared before and after well-publicized executions (cf. 
Waldo and Chiricos, 1972; Savitz, 1958). Sellin (1967:124) 
finds homicide rates to be largely unaffected in states in 
which capital punishment has been temporarily abolished and 
then reinstated. The apparent failure of capital punishment 
in deterring homicide reduced interest in deterrence research 
for some time, but there was a renewed interest in the late 
1960's (Gibbs, 1975) .
Refinements in the measurement of certainty and severity 
have produced empirical evidence which supports, at least to 
a degree, the deterrence doctrine. Certainty is generally 
measured as the likelihood of receiving a sanction (see 
Tittle, 1980). Severity reflects the amount of punishment 
involved. It has been measured in numerous ways, ranging from 
the objective, prescribed legal punishments to perceptions of 
sanctions as consequential (see Grasmick and Bryjack, 1980). 
Gibbs (1968) looks at non-death penalty homicide cases, using 
the median number of months served as a measure of punishment 
severity. In a state to state comparison, the results show a 
moderate inverse relationship between homicide and both the 
certainty and severity of punishment. Tittle (1969), 
examining six different offenses, finds a negative association
7between certainty of punishment and crime rates for all six 
crimes, but a negative association between severity and crime 
rates only for homicide.
Certainty and severity of sanctions are regarded as 
important variables in the empirical study of deterrence. The 
predictive strength of each, as well as their interacting 
effects, are a major focus of deterrence research. The 
research results concerning the effects of certainty versus 
severity are mixed, possibly as a result of the different 
measures of the concepts used in the research.
Early research found certainty, but not severity, 
negatively associated with violations (Gibbs, 1968; Tittle, 
1969; Jensen, 1969; Chiricos and Waldo, 1970; Zimring and 
Hawkins, 1973). Tittle (1969) suggests that the absence of an 
inverse relationship between index crimes other than homicide 
and severity of punishment may be due to the lower certainty 
of being apprehended for crimes other than homicide. When it 
is unlikely that an individual will be caught in the first 
place, severity of punishment may produce little in the way of 
deterrence. In that case, sanction severity will deter only 
under circumstances of high certainty. Later research, using 
self-report data, suggests that the effect of sanction 
severity may have been underestimated (see, for example, 
Anderson, 1977; Grasmick and Bryjack, 1980; Tittle, 1980).
Research on Deterrence at the Individual Level 
More recent research has shifted the focus from aggregate
8rates of violation to the individual level. Anderson, 
Chiricos, and Waldo (1977) using self-report data on marijuana 
use, find a negative relationship between severity and 
violation under high levels of certainty. Meier and Johnson, 
(1977) however, report a positive relationship between 
marijuana use and severity. Like Anderson (1977), Grasmick 
and Bryjack (1980) find a negative relationship between 
severity and violation. They note that the lack of 
association between severity and deterrence is counter to the 
logic of the utilitarian principle on which the deterrence 
doctrine is based, and they fault previous studies for failing 
to properly conceptualize severity. Grasmick and Bryjack 
(1980) measure severity as respondents' beliefs about the 
consequences of the punishment that will be received if they 
are convicted of a specific crime. Their data suggest a 
relationship between the variables of certainty and severity. 
Severity is an effective deterrent under conditions of fairly 
high certainty, and certainty is effective under fairly high 
levels of severity.
Tittle (1980) also finds severity to be an important 
component in deterrence. Depending on the source of the 
sanction, severity is more strongly related to violation than 
certainty. When the source of sanction is either perceived 
community reaction or perceived interpersonal reaction, 
severity is the stronger variable. Certainty is a stronger 
deterrent than severity only for legal sanctions, and this is
9partly attributed to informal reactions to the formal 
sanction.
Aday and Anderson (1991) suggest that the different 
findings on perceived severity and violation may result from 
the use of two distinct conceptions of severity: severity as 
important consequence; and severity as illegitimacy. Noting 
differential association theory, and the related "techniques 
of neutralization" (cf. Aday and Anderson, 1991; Sykes and 
Matza, 1957), it is suggested that becoming delinquent 
involves learning behaviors and definitions that support law 
violation, including definitions of punishments as 
inconsequential. This will result in a negative correlation 
between perceived severity, measured as important consequence, 
and violation. Those who define the punishments as irrelevant 
will be more likely to violate the laws. The obverse also may 
be true. Some may reject the legitimacy of certain laws. 
These people will be more likely to violate such laws, and to 
regard any penalties as inappropriate. In this case, the 
evidence will support Meier and Johnson's (1977) finding of a 
positive correlation between perceived sanctions, as being 
illegitimate, and violation. A direct test of this 
relationship, and the use of longitudinal data, may make clear 
the relationship between perceptions and behavior.
Objective Sanctions versus Perceptions of Sanctions 
The above findings suggest that the results of deterrence 
research may vary based on the measurement of sanction.
10
Similarly, differences between measures of objective and 
perceived sanctions may affect research findings on 
deterrence. Gibbs (197 5) points to the importance of the 
public's perception that something is sanctioned, and the fact 
that certainty and severity are evaluative concepts. A 
sanction may be perceived as more or less certain or severe, 
and these perceptions may vary widely across individuals and 
groups. Despite recognition of the importance of perception, 
almost all early research, aggregate research in particular, 
used objective measures of certainty and severity (see 
Schuessler, 1952; Savitz, 1958; Gibbs, 1968; Tittle,1969).
Erickson and Gibbs (197 8) compare objective certainty of 
arrest with perceived certainty of arrest and find a 
moderately close direct relationship between objective and 
perceived severity, and a moderately close inverse 
relationship between perceived certainty and the aggregate 
crime rate. However, their findings do not indicate that 
objective certainty of punishment is related to crime rates 
through perceived certainty. Jensen, Erickson and Gibbs 
(1978: 58), stressing that the deterrence doctrine is "first 
and foremost a perceptual theory," examine perceived certainty 
as a deterrent in their study of high school delinquency. 
Their findings support the relevance of measures of 
perceptions of sanctions in deterrence research.
Tittle (1980) finds that perceptions of sanction 
probabilities are not influenced very much by experience with
11
and knowledge of actual sanctions. Experiences with formal 
sanctions, and knowledge of others who have been formally 
sanctioned, are only weakly related to perceived certainty and 
severity. To the extent that they are related, actual 
experience with sanctions, or with others who have been 
sanctioned, are related to lowered perceptions of perceived 
certainty and severity of sanction. Overall, the research 
suggests that objective measures of certainty and severity are 
related differently to violations than are measures of 
perceived certainty and severity.
Formal versus Informal Sanctions 
Formal sanctions are applied through laws and special 
agencies, whereas informal control operates through 
interpersonal devices such as rumor and reputation (cf. Aday 
and Anderson, 1991:9; Durkheim, 1964). Anderson, Chiricos, 
and Waldo (1977: 107) note the necessity of a "complete"
deterrence paradigm which includes both formal and informal 
sanctions and their interactions. Their study, using self- 
report data on marijuana use, suggests that perceived informal 
sanctions are at least as consequential for behavior as 
perceived formal sanctions.
Tittle (1980) compares informal and formal sanctions, and 
the results indicate that informal sanctions are far more 
effective in inhibiting deviance. He also finds that informal 
sanctions, applied through personal relationships, have a 
stronger effect than do community-level informal sanctions.
12
Across nine offenses, ranging from informal norms, such as 
lying and failing to stand during the national anthem, to 
violations of laws, such as assault and theft, the most potent 
deterrent is the perceived potential loss of respect among 
those one knows personally. Analysis of the interaction 
between formal and informal sanctions shows that anticipated 
informal sanction operates independently of formal sanction 
fear. Formal sanction fear is found to be attributable to the 
fear of informal sanction with only one exception.
Personal and Aggregate Risks 
Differences between personal and aggregate risks also have 
been found to affect the strength of deterrence. Aggregate 
risk refers to the risk of sanction to the average person in 
the population, whereas personal risk refers to the risk of 
sanction to the specific individual respondent. Waldo and 
Chiricos (1972: 535-7) argue that "perceptions of the
certainty of punishment appear most viable as a deterrent when 
they involve the potential criminal's estimate of his own 
chances for arrest and harsh penalties for a particular crime- 
independent of the chances for a generalized other."
Jensen, Erickson and Gibbs' (1978) study of delinquency 
finds that perceived personal risk is a stronger deterrent 
variable than perceived aggregate risk. Perceived personal 
risk has a stronger inverse relationship with the offenses of 
burglary, vandalism, shoplifting, and truancy, whereas 
perceived aggregate risk has a weaker, but still significant
13
deterrent effect. They suggest that the weaker relationship 
between aggregate measures of sanctions and violations might 
explain some findings that do not support the deterrence 
doctrine.
General Deterrent Effects 
Some studies of deterrence have found a "general" deterrence 
effect (Silberman, 1976; Jensen, Erickson and Gibbs, 1978; 
Tittle, 1980). Silberman (1976) argues for a form of general 
deterrence that can not be reduced to the perceived threat of 
punishment for specific offenses. The empirical finding is in 
relation to offenses that respondents saw as relatively 
unregulated (for example, shoplifting, premarital sex, 
marijuana use, and under-age drinking). Silberman suggests 
that the belief that criminal acts generally are punished may 
deter some individuals from committing deviant acts that 
otherwise are regarded as unregulated (1976, 446). Jensen, 
Erickson and Gibbs (1978) find a similar general deterrence 
effect in their study of self-reported delinquency, supporting 
Silberman's contention that the measure of combined perceived 
risk (ie. for several offenses) is as consistently related to 
a certain offense as is the measure of perceived risk for that 
specific offense.
Tittle (1980) finds similar results in his examination of 
diffuse and precise effects of sanctions. A precise effect is 
curtailment of a particular offense produced by the penalty 
threat attached to it. A diffuse effect refers to deterrence
14
of a particular offense due to penalties attached to other 
offenses, or a general sense of possible but imprecise 
sanction, i.e., general deterrence. Tittle’s results suggest 
that both precise and diffuse effects are involved in 
decisions about future deviance. However, precise processes 
seem to be most likely for informal sanctions, whereas diffuse 
effects are more characteristic of formal sanctions. Much 
conformity may be accounted for by the anticipation of 
reactions of acquaintances to particular deviant acts. 
Contemplation of legal consequences seems to have much less 
influence, and to be largely unfocused.
Sanctions and Status Characteristics 
Deterrence studies also have identified certain status 
characteristics that may influence deterrence. Tittle (1980) 
examines sex, age, race, social class, marital status, and 
labor force status. Only sex and age are related to 
deterrence under a variety of control conditions. Social 
class is not significantly related to deterrence effects, 
though where it is related, the relationship is slightly 
positive.
Silberman (1976) cites age, ethnicity, urbanism, social 
economic status, and sex as important control variables for 
examining deterrence, though his sample makes it impossible to 
examine all but the effects of gender. He finds that the 
deterrent effect of punishment is specific to males. None of 
the correlations between the probability of committing an
15
offense and the certainty of punishment is significant for 
females.
Tittle (1980) finds no significant differences between 
males and females in deterrence at equal levels of perceived 
sanction. Where differences are observed, it appears that 
males are more susceptible to deterrence. However, women 
perceive sanction threats to be greater than do men, so their 
actual curtailment of deviance should be greater. This is 
consistent with an earlier finding (Tittle and Rowe, 1973) 
that shows females to be almost twice as likely as males to 
reduce classroom cheating after a direct sanction threat to 
the class.
Contrary to the findings of both Silberman and Tittle 
concerning the relationship between gender and deterrence, 
Anderson, Chiricos, and Waldo (1977) find the strength of 
deterrence relationships the same for men and women in actual 
curtailment of deviance. For each of five perceived 
sanctions, correlations with marijuana use are stronger among 
males than females, but the differences are so slight as to 
warrant the conclusion of "no difference" (109).
With regard to age, Tittle (1980) finds that at equal 
levels of perceived sanction there is no clear pattern of 
differential deterrence from one age group to the next. 
However, Tittle suggests that older respondents may be more 
deterred because they perceive the sanction threat to be 
greater than do younger respondents. He finds a steady
16
increase from youngest to oldest age category in perceptions 
of informal sanctions for every offense. This should result 
in a higher actual degree of deterrence for older age 
categories, despite equal deterrability when perceived 
sanction threats are held constant.
Methodological Issues and Deterrence Research 
Sample design also may influence the results of deterrence 
research. Paternoster et al. (ed. Hagan, 1982: 56) note that 
the typical methodology in deterrence research involves 
reports of past criminal behavior collected at the same time 
as reports of respondents' perceptions of the certainty and 
severity of sanctions. As a result, researchers actually may 
be describing an "experiential" effect: the effect of
previously committed behaviors on current perceptions. A 
negative relationship between perceived sanction and violation 
could indicate that those who commit illegal acts and elude 
punishment tend to lower their perception of risk. By using 
a two-wave panel design, Paternoster et al. are able to 
distinguish between a deterrent effect and an experiential 
effect, as they examine the relationship between current 
perceptions and subsequent behavior.
The results of their longitudinal study suggest a weak 
and generally insignificant deterrent effect. The authors 
suggest that much prior research may have been picking up the 
experiential effect in addition to a weak deterrent effect. 
They infer from the data that the deterrent and experiential
17
effects are independent, and that the perceptions-behavior 
relationship is a reciprocal one, though this relationship may 
be difficult to specify and even harder to measure. 
Deterrence and Theories of Deviance and Social Control 
Researchers are beginning to explore the effects of sanctions 
within the context of general theories of deviance and social 
control. Hirschi’s (1969) social control theory focuses on 
the reasons people do not violate social norms. People are 
constrained by "bonds" to society and its institutions. 
Hirschi cites four bonds which tie individuals to society: 
commitment to success through conventional terms? attachment 
to parents, peers and social institutions? involvement in 
conventional activities? and belief in conventional norms. 
When these social bonds are weak, the likelihood of rule 
violation increases. Social control theory does not examine 
the possible mediating effects of sanctions and definitional 
concepts.
In contrast to social control theory, Sutherland's (1978) 
differential association theory examines how relationships and 
interactions with deviant others may increase the likelihood 
of engaging in deviant activities. Through associations with 
deviant others, individuals may learn definitions and behavior 
patterns which are favorable to violation. Similarly, they 
may learn related "techniques of neutralization" in which 
sanction consequences come to be defined as inconsequential 
(cf. Aday and Anderson, 1991? Sykes and Matza, 1957).
18
Matsueda (1982) compared models of social control theory 
and differential association using data from the Richmond 
Youth Project (the original data for Hirschi's control 
theory). In the differential association model, the ratio of 
definitions favorable and unfavorable to delinquency mediates 
the effects of associations and background variable. 
Attachment to friends or parents affects delinquency "...only 
insofar as it affects the learning of definitions favorable 
and unfavorable to law violation" (Matsueda, 1982: 493). In 
the control theory model, attachments are related directly to 
delinquency, and indirectly to delinquency through 
definitions. In addition, background variables operate 
indirectly through both definitions and attachments.
Matsueda1s findings suggest that the variable 
"definitions" mediates the effects of all background variables 
observed (age, social economic status, perceived amount of 
trouble in the neighborhood, and coming from a broken home). 
It also mediates the entire effect of variables which, in 
control theory, should be related directly to delinquency 
(peer and parental attachment).
Massey and Krohn (1986) incorporate constructs from both 
social control theory and differential association. They 
criticize social control theory for its failure to explain why 
a person would engage in deviant activities if freed from the 
social bond. On the other hand, they note that differential 
association theory fails to explain why individuals are likely
19
to associate with deviant others in the first place. Their 
findings suggest that weakened social bonds increase the 
likelihood of associations with deviant others, and operate 
indirectly on deviance through peer associations. Both 
commitment and belief are related strongly to an individual's 
peer associations. The findings also indicate that bonding 
elements have a significant direct relationship with deviance, 
though commitment to school is the only variable that showed 
the hypothesized direct effect.
Tittle's (1980) comprehensive study of deterrence 
examines the effectiveness of deterrence controlling for 
variables from social control, differential association, and 
other major theories of deviance. He examines the
relationship between deterrence, moral commitment, social 
integration, deprivation of means, alienation from culturally 
approved goals and means, differential association, legitimacy 
ascribed to the norm, and legal processing or labeling. He 
compares the effects of these eight variables on a variety of 
norm and law violations. Controlling for variables from the 
other major theories of deviance, a deterrent effect is still 
apparent. Sanction fear remains negatively correlated with 
deviance, with general sanction fear ranking third as the best 
predictor of violation, behind moral commitment and 
differential association. However, the most potent form of 
sanction threat, fear of interpersonal loss of respect, is the 
best overall predictor of violating behavior.
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Silberman, (1976) incorporates a concept of moral 
attachment into his research on deterrence. As Matsueda 
(1982: 490) notes, in control theory's variable attachment
"there is variation in the extent to which people believe in 
societies' norms, and the less their belief the more likely 
they are to engage in delinquency." The social bond "belief" 
also reflects commitment to conventional values and norms. 
Massey and Krohn (1986) argue that social control theory 
assumes that people who believe strongly in the moral validity 
of conventional standards of conduct are unlikely to become 
involved in deviant behavior.
Siberman's general theory examines the additive and 
interactive effects of moral commitment, perceived sanctions, 
and patterns of differential association. His findings show 
that the independent variables fit a causal chain model, where 
morality is associated with peer involvement, which is in turn 
associated with perceived severity of punishment, which is 
associated with perceived certainty of punishment (448-9).
In other words, those who are less morally committed are 
more likely to be associated with others who are involved
in criminal activities. Those who are associated with 
others who are criminally involved are more likely to
perceive that people who are convicted of crimes are severely 
punished, and those who perceive that criminal sanctions are 
severe are more likely to perceive that persons like
themselves who commit crimes are more likely to be caught 
by the police (449) .
Moral commitment explains most of the variance, with 
differential association coming second. Certainty of 
punishment has a weak independent effect, and its interaction
21
with morality explains another portion of variance, though it 
is in turn partly a function of the degree of moral 
commitment. Thus when individuals are morally committed to a 
norm, they obey the related regulations regardless of the 
sanctions. However, when commitment to a rule is low, 
sanctions take on greater importance in deciding whether or 
not to violate the rule. Moral support for laws and 
association with those who support such laws critically 
condition the effects of legal sanctions.
In a similar vein, Waldo and Chiricos (1972) find a 
difference in deterrability between offenses that are "mala 
prohibita" and offenses that are "mala in se." Offenses that 
are "mala prohibita" are prohibited by legal sanctions (for 
example, marijuana use) , but lack strong consensual 
condemnation. Offenses that are "mala in se" are against the 
moral code of the society (for example, stealing). "Mala 
prohibita" offenses are found to be more subject to deterrent 
effects than are "mala in se" offenses. Perceived, specific 
certainty of sanction is negatively related to both types of 
violations, but the relationship is stronger for the "mala 
prohibita" item. Likewise, Tittle (1980) finds a slight 
tendency for deterrence to be least where aggregate and 
personal judgements of immorality, seriousness, and legitimacy 
of the associated norm are greatest (though the evidence is 
not strong).
Meier and Johnson (1977) suggest that formal sanctions
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are a weak source of threat, with most of the effect being 
indirect in nature. Social support and the belief that 
marijuana smoking is immoral have stronger and more direct 
effects than do legal sanctions, and, as noted above, they 
find a positive relationship between perceived severity and 
violation. They suggest that this relationship is a 
reflection of the moral outrage felt by users towards 
marijuana laws (see the above discussion of "severity as 
illegitimacy" versus "severity as important consequence").
Erickson and Gibbs (1978) report similar findings when 
they control for social condemnation of the violation by 
respondents. Under such conditions, they find no significant 
relationship between the perceived certainty of punishment and 
the crime rate (note, however, that this refers to aggregate 
crime rates). However, in Jensen, Erickson and Gibbs' (1978) 
study using individual level data to describe delinquency by 
high school students, the perceived risk of punishment is 
inversely related to self-reported delinquency, controlling 
for social condemnation of the specific violation.
The interplay between condemnation or source of moral 
judgement and sanction must be measured in any comprehensive 
deterrence research. Aday (1990) presents a theory of 
deviance and social control that draws from classical theories 
of social organization to propose a general explanation of 
rates and causes of deviance. Aday suggests that as social 
integration decreases both violations and social control
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increase. As integration decreases, diversity increases and 
the proportion of interpersonal relationships which support 
the conventional order decreases. Opportunities for violating 
conduct increase. Concurrently, lower levels of integration 
increase the opportunity for associations with deviant others, 
who provide definitions and behaviors which are favorable to 
violations. Meanwhile, levels of social control in general, 
and formal social control in particular, increase as well.
Aday looks at integration in terms of three dimensions of 
societal organization: solidarity, equilibrium, and
commonality. Equilibrium refers to the organization of 
society as a system of interdependent parts or institutions. 
Each institution supports the social order through its 
structure and consequences, and the social order has survival 
value as long as the institutions meet the system's needs. 
Solidarity refers to organization as a division of labor. 
Integration here may result from similarities among parts, 
including groups and other structural arrangements, as in 
mechanical solidarity. Integration also may be due to 
interdependence that results from differentiation, as in the 
case of organic solidarity. "Regardless, integration means 
that the system is composed of parts that fit together" (cf. 
Aday and Anderson, 1991: 5; Inverarity, Lauderdale, and Feld, 
1983: 148-156).
"Commonality refers to the cultural dimension of 
integration" (Aday and Anderson, 1991: 5). Based on Weber's
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discussion of social action and Durkheim's ideas of the 
collective conscience, the concept of commonality focuses on 
integration in terms of the shared system of beliefs which 
serve to organize and constrain human social activity.
Working from convergence theory, Aday and Anderson (1991) 
propose a general explanation of adolescent drug use. They 
combine variables from differential association theory, 
social control theory, and deterrence, and a general 
conception of social control and societal integration, and 
apply them to adolescent drug use. From control theory, they 
draw the variables of attachments, involvement, and belief. 
Aday and Anderson look at these bonds as elements of societal 
integration. Such bonds should be negatively correlated with 
violations, and the empirical evidence from the study supports 
the expectation.
These researchers examine differential association in 
terms of relationships with others who are violators of rules, 
and in terms of definitions favorable to violation. These two 
variables were predicted to be positively associated with 
violation, and again the data support the prediction.
Aday and Anderson measure deterrence in terms of 
perceptions of consequences of arrest and conviction. They 
find that the variable of perceptions reduces the predictive 
power of the model. They believe that this finding may result 
from their relatively weak measure of perception, and 
uncertainty both in theories and in results of empirical
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research as to the place of perceptions in the causal process.
Overall, the strongest positive relationship is the 
direct correlation between association and violations. There 
also are strong indirect relationships between association and 
violations. These indirect effects occur through the 
variables of learning violations and perceptions. The 
variable of learning violations also is related directly to 
both violations and perceptions, and indirectly to violations 
through perceptions.
The model of drug use predicts that social bonds (from 
control theory) will'be correlated negatively with violation, 
while differential association will be related positively. 
Perception, measured as defining punishments as 
inconsequential, will be related positively to violations. 
Social bonds maintain conformity, keeping the individual 
integrated into conventional society. On the other hand, 
individuals may learn definitions and behaviors that are 
favorable to violation of the conventional order through 
differential associations. Some definitions favorable to 
violation may include definitions of sanctions as 
inconsequential. Perceptions of sanctions as being
inconsequential should facilitate violating behavior.
The model also looks at the effects of social control and 
social integration. Aday and Anderson (1991) link their model 
of social control with Weber's typology of authority. Weber 
specified three types of authority: traditional,
26
bureaucratic, and charismatic. These authority types differ 
according to the source of the control and the source of 
legitimacy among subordinates. According to Aday and Anderson 
(1991: 9-10), traditional authority is based in custom, and
legitimized by shared beliefs about a common history.
Bureaucratic, or rational, authority is legitimated by 
impersonal rules. The authority for making and enforcing the 
rules is attached to some position or arrangement within an 
organization. Agreement on the substance of rules among those 
subjected to the rules is not necessary as long as proper 
procedures are followed in the creation and enforcement of the 
rules. Aday and Anderson do not examine charismatic authority 
in their model, but it refers to authority based on the shared 
beliefs about the extraordinary qualities of a specific 
individual.
The source of authority is predicted to affect the 
consequences of social control, specifically integration.
According to Aday and Anderson (1991), formal social control 
is predicted to enhance integration when there is a consensus, 
and when it involves building a consensus. It constrains 
those who are effectively attached to the social order. 
However, formal social control actually may increase the
probability of violation for those not attached to the social
order. Such a change would result from reactions to imposed 
social control as illegitimate and inappropriate (cf. Meier 
and Johnson, 1977). Informal social control is positively
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related to integration, and enhances attachment by promoting 
consensus. Using a measure of formal control, the researchers 
report a weak positive relationship between social control and 
violations, though the data did not allow specification of the 
nature or order of the relationship.
The relationship between integration and social control 
is expected to vary depending on respondents' participation in 
violating behavior. There is a weak positive relationship 
between social control and integration for non-violators. 
Among violators, the association is weak but negative. Aday 
and Anderson (1991) note that integration is a difficult 
concept to measure objectively. Their measure combines a 
general happiness scale and a measure of respondents' beliefs 
about their abilities to carry out life plans. Perhaps 
because of the weak measure, the results are not as strong as 
the theory predicts.
The results of research into the question of deterrence 
vary greatly. Some of the disparities are the results of 
different conceptualizations and measurements of key 
variables. Generally, the literature seems to indicate that 
perceptions of sanctions as consequential has some deterrent 
effect. This effect is much greater when the source of 
sanction is an informal, rather than formal, agent. The 
effect also appears to be stronger for those who are less 
committed to the normative order, men, and younger people. 
Highly committed individuals, women, and older individuals
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seem to perceive sanction threat as being greater, but they 
are less deterred by their perceptions because they are 
already constrained by bonds to the normative order.
SURVEY AND DATA
The data for the current study are from the National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY), 1979-1982. The target
population for the NLSY consists of non-institutionalized 
youth, who in 1979 were 14-21 and who were living within the 
United States or were on active duty for the military outside 
of the U.S. Three sub-samples were selected using standard 
area probability sampling. The three sub-samples include a 
cross-sectional sample of non-institutionalized civilians age 
14-21 as of January 1, 1979, a supplemental over-sample of
hispanic, black, and economically-disadvantaged non-hispanic 
and non-black youth, and a sample of youths 17-21 serving in 
the military. The participants in the base year (1979) survey 
formed the target samples for follow-up surveys in 1980, 1981, 
and 1982 using altered questionnaires. Attrition rates were 
low, ranging from 4% to 6% in the 1982 survey. The majority 
of the data were collected through personal face-to-face 
interviews, each lasting about an hour (Steel, Lauri, Eaton, 
and Carr, 1984). This study uses a sub-sample of the above 
population consisting of only those individuals who were 
enrolled in primary or secondary school at the time of the
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initial 1979 interview.
CURRENT STUDY
The current study examines two separate but related issues. 
1) the relationship between commitment, perceived sanction 
threats and rule violations, and 2) the more general 
relationship between commitment, rule violations, and social 
control. Deterrence research suggests that commitment to 
conventional norms and rules critically conditions the effects 
of sanction threats. Those who are committed to the 
conventional order perceive a higher threat of sanction than 
those who are less committed. However, those whose commitment 
is low appear to be more deterred by sanction threats. The 
highly committed are constrained from committing violations by 
their bonds to society, so sanction threat has little relation 
to violations. Those who are weakly committed are not 
constrained by social bonds, so the effects of sanction 
threats on violating behavior is greater. In general, then, 
the highly committed perceive greater sanction threat, but 
they do not commit violations because they believe in the 
normative order. The lowly committed are constrained to 
whatever extent mainly through the threat of sanctions.
According to the deterrence doctrine, perceived sanction 
threats should be negatively related to rule violations. When 
sanctions are perceived to be consequential, individuals
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should be deterred from committing violations. When sanction 
threat is deemed inconsequential, rates of violations should 
be higher. As suggested above, the effect of perceptions of 
sanction threats as consequential should have a greater impact 
on those who are lowly committed to the conventional order.
The relationship between commitment and social control 
should vary depending on the degree of commitment. Social 
control is defined generally as the application of negative 
sanctions for disapproved behavior. At high levels of 
commitment, social control should serve to reinforce 
commitment, while at low levels, social control may further 
separate the individual from the normative order. 
Theoretically, social control should reduce the incidence of 
violations for the highly committed, but not for those who are 
weakly committed. The data do not provide the time ordering 
of events that is necessary to examine the relationship 
between social control and violations. The general model is 
presented in figure 1.
FIGURE 1
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31
The proposed model can be summarized as follows. At the 
most general level, commitment and perception of sanction 
threat will be related directly and positively. When 
commitment to conventional norms is high, perceptions of the 
consequences of sanctions should be high. Perception of 
punishment as consequential should be related to low rates of 
violation. When violations do occur, the imposition of 
sanctions should reduce violations and increase commitment to 
the conventional order, commitment being a reflection of one 
dimension of integration. However, when commitment is low, 
perceptions of sanctions as consequential should be low. If 
sanction threat is perceived to be low, rates of violation 
should be relatively high. Social control will have less 
effect on violations, and that effect will be to diminish 
commitment and consequently, increase rates of violation.
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
Perceived sanction threat is described through responses to 
the statement "students can get away with anything". This 
measure reflects a subjective sense of general threat which, 
according to some research (see Silberman, 1976; Jensen, 
Erickson and Gibbs, 1978; Tittle, 1980) is as consistently 
related to certain offenses as is a measure of perceived risk 
for the specific offense. It collapses issues of certainty 
and severity into a measure of perceived consequences in
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general. The measure refers to sanction as a consequence 
rather than to the perceived legitimacy of sanctioning. It 
measures perceived aggregate risk, which may somewhat reduce 
the strength of the measured relationships (see Waldo and 
Chiricos, 1972; Jenson, Erickson, and Gibbs, 1978). The 
reference is to high school and the prospects of formal 
sanction, though as Tittle (1980) suggests, much of the 
deterrent effect may be derived from associated informal 
sanctions (i.e., anticipated parents' or friends' reactions to 
the youth being suspended or expelled).
Violations refer to school related rule or law 
violations. This concept is operationalized as self-reported 
instances of truancy and fighting in school. An examination 
of the relationship between these self-reported behaviors 
reveals a moderate correlation (phi=.310, P< .000). The 
measure is not inclusive, and instances of social control may 
occur in response to violations not included in this measure. 
Social control is measured as self-reports of suspension or 
expulsion from school. Stinchcombe (1964) found that non- 
conforming students were less likely than conforming students 
to answer questionnaires properly. As a result, the 
relationship between commitment, violation and social control 
may be shown as weaker than it actually is for those with low 
commitment, though the use of face-to-face interviews may 
somewhat alleviate this problem.
Commitment to school is used as an indicator of
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integration. Respondents were asked the grade level that they 
desire to complete, and their responses provide a measure of 
the level of commitment. Commitment is measured for three 
separate time periods. It is not a measure of moral 
commitment to education, but a reflection of subscription to 
conventional methods of success. For purposes of analysis, 
all of the variables are collapsed into dummy variables. 
Commitment is measured as either high or low, low being the 
desire to complete 12th grade or less (41.5 percent of
respondents at time one), and high being the desire to go to 
some college (58.5 percent of respondents at time one).
Perception of sanction threat was measured as either high or 
low, low being the perception of some degree of truth in the 
statement "kids at this school get away with anything" (63.4 
percent of respondents), and high being the perception of no 
truth to that statement (36.6 percent of respondents). 
Violation (self-reports of fighting in school and truancy) was 
collapsed to indicate either no violations (37.6 percent of 
respondents) or one or more violations (62.4 percent of
respondents). Social control was collapsed to indicate either 
no suspensions or expulsions (74.6 percent of respondents) or 
one or more suspensions or expulsions (25.4 percent of
respondents). (The marginal distributions for these variables 
are reported in the Appendix.)
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FINDINGS
It should be noted that the significance level of the 
correlations will be high simply as a result of the large 
sample. I will pay attention primarily to the size and sign 
of the correlation for reporting the results. The analyses 
indicate that the measure of commitment (or school attachment) 
is fairly stable over times one, two, and three (see Table 1 
below). The relationship is positive, as expected. The 
moderate correlations between the same measures at different 
time periods may reflect a maturation process. Four years 
separate the measure of commitment at time one and commitment 
at time three, during which future plans regarding education 
may have become more concrete and realistic.
TABLE 1 
PHI COEFFICIENTS 
OF COMMITMENT AT THREE TIMES 
SUBSAMPLE OF NLSY
Commitment at T1 r Commitment at T2 = 0.484; P < 0.000
Commitment at T1 r Commitment at T3 = 0.4 54; P < 0.000
Commitment at T2 r Commitment at T3 = 0.667; P < 0.000
The relationship between commitment at time one and 
perception of sanction threats was not in the direction 
predicted. There was a slight tendency for those with lower 
commitment to perceive a higher sanction threat, though the 
correlation was small (P< .01; see Table 2).
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TABLE 2
THE ASSOCIATION OF PERCEPTION AND COMMITMENT T1 
SUBSAMPLE OF THE NLSY
PERCEIVED
SANCTION
THREAT
COMMITMENT 
TO EDUCATION
LO HI
LO 61.3 64.8 2923
63.4
HI 38 . 7 35.2 1691
36.6
11911 2703 4614
41.4 58 . 6 100.
STATISTICS
PHI
VALUE 
-0.03 5 P< 0.0083
The relationship between perceived sanction threats and 
rule violations was negative for both high and low
commitment, but was much stronger for low commitment. At high 
levels of commitment, the relationship was weak and not 
significant. At low levels of commitment, the relationship 
was slightly stronger and significant. At low commitment, 
those who perceived sanction threat as low were more likely to 
have one or more violations than those who perceived the 
sanction threat as high. For the highly committed, 
perception of sanction threat had little relationship to 
violation (see Tables 3 and 4).
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TABLE 3
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS 
OF SANCTIONS AND LOW COMMITMENT 
SUBSAMPLE OF NLSY
LOW COMMITMENT TO EDUCATION
RULE
VIOLATIONS
PERCEIVED
SANCTION
THREAT
LO HI
NONE 29 . 2 35.4 464
31.7
1 OR 
MORE
70 . 8 64 . 6 1002
68.3
893 573 1466
60. 9 39.1 100. C
STATISTICS VALUE
PHI -0.065 P< 0.0064
TABLE 4 
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 
SANCTION THREAT AND HIGH COMMITMENT 
SUBSAMPLE OF NLSY
HIGH COMMITMENT TO EDUCATION
RULE
VIOLATIONS
PERCEIVED
SANCTION
THREAT
LO HI
NONE 41.0 42 . 8 906
41.6
1 OR 
MORE
59 . 0 57 . 2 1271
58.4
1404 773 2177
64 . 5 35.5 100.<
STATISTICS
PHI
VALUE
-0.018 P< 0.1991
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The zero-order correlation between commitment at time one 
and commitment at time two is .484 (phi coefficient; P< 
.0001). Note that social control as it is measured here 
occurred before the report of level of commitment at time two. 
For those who are subjected to social control, the correlation 
between commitment at time one and commitment at time two is 
.400 (phi coefficient; P< .0001). For those who were not 
subjected to social control, the correlation at time two is 
.488 (P< .0001). In addition, the relationship between
commitment and social control is negative, and it is stronger 
at time two (-.195; P< .0001) than it was at time one (-.184; 
P< .0001).
DISCUSSION
The expected relationship between commitment and sanction 
threat as consequential was not supported by the data. This 
may be due to the relatively weak measure of perception. 
Though the correlations were weak, weakly committed 
individuals had a slightly higher perception of sanction 
threat than did highly committed individuals. Measures of 
general sanction fear and formal sanction threat continue to 
show only modest deterrence effects (Waldo and Chiricos, 1972; 
Jenson, Erickson and Gibbs, 1978; Tittle, 1980).
The measure of commitment also may have been a weak 
reflection of integration into the conventional order. As was
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suggested earlier, integration is a difficult concept to 
operationalize. The distribution of responses to the 
commitment question required a collapsed measure that 
distinguishes only those who plan to complete 12th grade or 
less from those who wish to do some college study. This 
limited response range almost certainly affected the results. 
A conceptualization which includes some measure of time or 
effort involved in school would be a better indicator of 
commitment to education.
The relationship between perception of sanction threat 
and violation, though relatively weak, was consistent with the 
proposed model and the general body of deterrence research. 
For both high and low commitment, perceptions of sanctions as 
consequential was related to lower violations, though for high 
levels of commitment the relationship was not significant. As 
expected, this relationship is stronger for the weakly 
committed, presumably those who are not constrained by 
commitment to the rules. The data support previous findings 
that suggest that commitment to rules and laws reduces the 
effect of sanctions (see Silberman, 1976; Meier and Johnson, 
1977; Waldo and Chiricos, 1972; Tittle, 1980).
The theoretical complexities of the social 
control/commitment relationship can not be examined with the 
current data. However, some of the findings suggest that 
social control may reduce commitment under certain 
circumstances. Theoretically, social control enhances
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commitment for those who are already highly committed, and
reduces commitment for those who are lowly committed. The
data for this study indicate that social control weakened 
commitment. Overall, this sample was only moderately 
committed, as 41.4 percent were classified as low on
commitment. The relationship between social control and 
commitment was negative, as would be expected, and more
strongly negative at time two than at time one. The 
correlation between commitment at time one and commitment at 
time two is lower for those who have experienced social 
control than for those who have not experienced social control 
(phi=.400 and phi=.488 respectively, see p. 31). These 
interpretations must be qualified because of the weak measure 
of commitment and the possibility that the relationship 
between measures at times one and two are affected by the 
maturation of the respondents.
This research suggests that perceptions of sanction 
threats as consequential are related to lower violations. 
Consistent with previous research, perceptions of sanction 
threats seem to affect those who are weakly committed to the 
normative order more strongly than those who are strongly 
committed. However, the relationship between commitment and 
perception of sanctions is unclear. The data suggest that the 
weakly committed may actually perceive a greater sanction 
threat than those who are highly committed, though this 
conclusion is limited by weak measures of commitment and
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perception. The data do suggest that commitment is affected 
by social control, though this finding is tentative at best. 
This finding is consistent with Durkheim's (1964) discussion 
of the relationship between social control and commitment. 
Social control is integrative when it is restitutive in nature 
but it is not integrative when it is repressive.
The results of the time comparisons of commitment at 
times one and two can be taken only as suggestive. The 
imposition of social control was related to a slight decrease 
in commitment from time one to time two. This decrease is 
consistent with the proposed model considering the high 
percentage of respondents classified as "low commitment." As 
indicated by Table 2, 41.4 percent of the respondents were
classified as weakly committed. Thus the imposition of social 
control might be expected to decrease the overall level of 
commitment at time two. However, the difference between the 
two times is small, the effect of maturation on commitment at 
time two is unspecified, and the measure of commitment itself 
is questionable.
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Appendix A
Marginal distributions for dummied variables.
PERCEIVED SANCTION THREAT: STUDENTS GET AWAY WITH ANYTHING
VARIABLE LABEL VALUE FREQUENCY VALID
PERCENT
LO: NOT TOO TRUE THRU VERY TRUE 1 2930 63.4
HI: NOT TRUE AT ALL 2 1695 36.6
MISSING -3 20 MISSING
TOTAL 4645 100.0
COMMITMENT AT TIME 1
VARIABLE LABEL VALUE FREQUENCY VALID
PERCENT
LOW COMMITMENT 1 1923 41.5
HIGH COMMITMENT 2 2710 58.5
MISSING -3 12 MISSING
TOTAL 4645 100.0
COMMITMENT AT TIME 2
VARIABLE LABEL VALUE FREQUENCY VALID
PERCENT
LOW COMMITMENT 1 1924 42.6
HIGH COMMITMENT 2 2596 57.4
MISSING -3 120 MISSING
TOTAL 4645 100.0
COMMITMENT AT TIME 3
VARIABLE LABEL VALUE FREQUENCY VALID
PERCENT
LOW COMMITMENT 1 1821 40.5
HIGH COMMITMENT 2 2676 59.5
MISSING -3 148 MISSING
TOTAL 4645 100. 0
AMOUNT OF SOCIAL CONTROL
VARIABLE LABEL VALUE FREQUENCY VALID
PERCENT
NO SOCIAL CONTROL 1 3370 74.6
SOME SOCIAL CONTROL 2 1149 25.4
MISSING -3 126 MISSING
TOTAL 4645 100. 0
VIOLATIONS
VARIABLE LABEL VALUE FREQUENCY VALID
PERCENT
NO VIOLATIONS 1 1377 37.6
1 OR MORE VIOLATIONS 2 2290 62.4
MISSING -3 978 MISSING
TOTAL 4645 100. 0
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